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ABSTRACT" This article examines the evolution of fetal protection policies (FPPs) by 
detailing their historical legacy and a range of contemporary social forces that have 
contributed to their maintenance. It is based on a case study of the 1977 U.S. Depart- 
ment of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) hearings to 
revise the industrial lead standard, the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court decision that such 
policies are unconstitutional (United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 1991), and the 
case law preceding that decision. A primary issue is the notion that women and fetuses 
are disproportionately susceptible to lead. This study reveals the ways in which this 
belief is framed, disputed, and appropriated by various parties to the fetal protection 
policy debate. Implications of this case study for family health policy are also discussed. 
KEY WORDS: employment discrimination, exclusionary policies, gender roles, occu- 
pational health, occupational segregation. 
Introduct ion 
In March 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in 
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, a landmark case for gender 
equality. Reversing lower court decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that gender-based fetal protection policies (FPPs) on the part of 
employers are unconstitutional. Such policies have excluded women 
for many years from production jobs in lead industries such as auto- 
mobile battery manufacturing and smelting unless they could demon- 
strate infertility. Companies argued that FPPs were necessary to pro- 
tect the health of any fetus a female worker might conceive. Johnson 
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Controls is far from alone in implementing exclusionary policies. 
Many large companies, including General Motors, Gulf, Dow, and Du 
Pont, adopted FPPs for women even though such policies deprived 
women of millions of jobs, often on the basis of inconclusive informa- 
tion, faulty assumptions about female frailty and fetal vulnerability, 
and disregard for sterility and birth defects caused by exposure of 
males to lead (Bertin, 1989). 
Protection of this sort has far-reaching practical as well as legal 
consequences. The primary legal effect of case law upholding such 
policies was to "cut the heart out of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964] and out of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act [of 1978]" 
(Marcus, 1990). In addition, some experts have argued that  FPPs vio- 
late the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth 
Amendment on the grounds that exclusion of women of childbearing 
capacity is drastically underinclusive and overinclusive. It is over- 
inclusive in that some women do not want children, are unable to 
have them, postpone childbearing, or would terminate a pregnancy by 
abortion. It is underinclusive because it did not consider adverse ef- 
fects on male reproductive capacity (U.S. Department of Labor 
[USDL], 1977, pp. 11, 13 [Exhibit 148]). 1 Furthermore, FPPs treated 
female employees as a class rather than as individuals. The treat- 
ment of women as a sexual class is a major, long-standing source of 
gender bias in judicial decisions (Eisenstein, 1979). Some have argued 
that special t reatment for women infringes on their economic rights 
and sets them apart as a separate, inferior class. 
The practical consequences of FPPs included protecting women out 
of some relatively secure, high-paying jobs in predominantly male 
sectors of the economy--to "sanction the resegregation of the work 
force" so that "women will end up in the jobs where they began before 
Title VII was passed" (Marcus, 1990). An even more dramatic effect of 
FPPs was that many female employees were sterilized so they could 
retain or secure employment in the lead industry. After the Occupa- 
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) revised the lead 
standard in 1978, industries that exposed workers to lead increas- 
ingly denied jobs to women unless they could furnish proof of infer- 
tility (Richardson, 1981). A well-publicized series of sterilizations oc- 
curred in 1979. Four female employees of American Cyanamid in 
West Virginia were sterilized after a company official implied that the 
surgery might help save their jobs. Eight women were informed of 
their imminent transfer to other jobs because of potential hazards to 
a fetus. They were to receive their current salaries for ninety days 
("Four Women," 1979). 
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The decision in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) re- 
affirmed and extended the government's commitment to gender 
equality in the workplace. Such principles are articulated in Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) as amended by the 1978 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Because no justices dissented from the 
majority opinion, however, one wonders why FPPs were practiced 
with impunity and upheld by the courts for so long. If the decision 
rested on issues about which legal scholars might reasonably dis- 
agree, one would expect such ambiguity to be reflected in the United 
Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls decision. This article argues that  
FPPs survived in the United States for many years because of a his- 
torical legacy reinforced by continued social, political, and economic 
legitimation. It analyzes the 1977 OSHA hearings to revise the indus- 
trial lead standard, situates them within a particular historical and 
legal context, and details a range of social forces which have contrib- 
uted to the maintenance of FPPs. 
The His tor ica l  Context  
Sex-specific exclusionary policies have been around for about a cen- 
tury. Protective labor laws were enacted in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries (see Kenen, 1993). They included laws to protect 
women from long hours, night work, physically taxing work such as 
heavy lifting and bartending. The four main types of protective laws 
regulated minimum wages, working conditions, hours, and type of oc- 
cupation (Conlin, 1975). Paradoxically, protective laws were not al- 
ways in the best interests of the women they were designed to serve. 
Rather, they were often based on ideological assumptions that  made 
them appear reasonable and necessary. As Lichtman ~ suggested, 
much of this legislation was enacted to protect women who were con- 
sidered to be fragile and in need of the state's intervention. Protective 
legislation implies, however, that women cannot c~,'e for themselves 
(Chafe, 1972). Thus the legal codification of protection for women is 
based on the notion that  women are more fragile and susceptible to a 
whole host of dangers than men. Moreover, earlier protective laws, 
like FPPs, often operated to oppress women economically (USDL, 
1977, p. 3 [Ex. 148]). 
Moreover, protective laws were frequently applied only to women 
even though they would have benefits for male health as well. Many 
scholars believe that although some protective laws were reasonable, 
necessary, and, therefore, beneficial to women, a sizable proportion 
316 Journal  o f  Fami ly  and Economic  Issues  
were arbitrary, discriminatory, ideological, and constraining for 
women. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court and 
other early proponents of protective laws for women recognized that 
both genders needed protection and that the ultimate goal of these 
laws was to regulate industry to protect all workers. Justice Frank- 
furter argued that men and women needed protection in different de- 
grees, a view consistent with the treatment of women as a class (Hill, 
1979). As one might expect, the belief in greater female susceptibility 
is mirrored in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) as well 
as in debates regarding the 1978 revision of the lead standard. Both 
are rooted in age-old notions regarding the characteristics and proper 
functions of women and men. 
Another assumption that informed many judicial pronouncements 
on protective policies was that female anatomy and resultant social 
roles create economic dependency for all womenJ Not surprisingly, 
this rationale was also given for FPPs. This belief is inconsistent with 
the fact that  most working women during the 1920s were sole sup- 
porters of themselves, their children, or their families (Hill, 1979). In 
more recent decades, many women subjected to FPPs either did not 
want children or had already completed their families. Lundquist ar- 
gued that single mothers without child support payments from any 
source "desperately need the higher paying jobs to be found in facto- 
ries either because of the pay or because of the hours of work" (USDL, 
1977, pp. 4515-4516). Because of their economic and caregiving re- 
sponsibilities, single mothers needed good jobs as much as if not more 
than fathers. After divorce, men's financial status increases an aver- 
age of 200%, while women's and children's status decreases about 
48% (Weitzman & Dixon, 1983). Furthermore, women remarry less 
often and later than men. 
Goesaert v. Cleary (1947) reflects some of the more ideologically 
based gender role assumptions underlying protection. The court ruled 
that women could not be bartenders unless they owned the  bar or 
were related to the owner. The key rationale was "moral and social 
problems" that developed when women tended bar, although these 
problems were vaguely defined. The court formed its conclusions with- 
out any proof or specific allegations regarding the existence of such 
problems. Moreover, affidavits of barmaids alleged that they had not 
experienced any such incidents while they tended bar (ranging from 
four to seventeen years) (Babcock, Freedman, Norton, & Ross, 1975). 
A law that generally excluded women from bartending could be con- 
strued as blaming or penalizing the victim rather than the perpetra- 
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tor of antisocial behavior. This method of correcting the "social prob- 
lem" was to protect barmaids (thereby depriving them of their jobs) 
rather than to penalize customers who acted disreputably (Babcock et 
al., 1975). In a later case (Dothard v. Rawlinson, 1977), the U.S. Su- 
preme Court excluded women from jobs as prison guards because of 
the risk of rape from male inmates, even though male guards were 
also vulnerable to assault. 
Some witnesses in the OSHA hearings noted similarities between 
FPPs and earlier protective laws. Miller and Madar noted "a clear 
parallel between the paternalistic state protective laws . . . and the 
present widespread practice of restricting women from jobs involving 
exposure to lead" ~OSHA, 1977, pp. 1138, 4728-4729). Rosen agreed 
that  women have been excluded from certain jobs because of pater- 
nalistic attitudes on the part of employers and labor unions. Although 
Hawes approved of protective laws, she disapproved of "the way pro- 
tective legislation, including the OSHAct, can be used as a battering 
ram to divide women against men" (USDL, 1977, p. 6743). Notwith- 
standing the similarities between FPPs and their legal predecessors, 
they may be distinguished according to their rationales. Although 
FPPs were often legitimated by scientific evidence, protective laws 
that  regulated occupations such as bartending typically emphasized 
moral considerations. Thus there has been a clear discursive shift 
from a moral to a scientific rhetoric of exclusion. 
FPPs are contemporary examples of a long-standing trend to ex- 
clude women from certain occupations. The rationales and economic 
consequences of FPPs are similar to those in earlier protective laws. 
The most dominant legitimations were that females are frail or more 
susceptible to a host of workplace dangers and that women were rela- 
tively marginal to the labor force because of their normative economic 
dependence on men. An important distinction, however, is that  FPPs 
relied exclusively on scientific argument whereas protective laws of- 
ten cited moral considerations (see Starrels, 1994, for a detailed dis- 
cussion of various types of legitimation). 
Legal Challenges 
A series of legal decisions, culminating in United Auto Workers v. 
Johnson Controls (1991), declared that protective laws were discrimi- 
natory. In 1969, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) issued a guideline on protective labor laws which stated that  
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they "tend to discriminate rather than protect" and they "conflict with 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" (EEOC, 1969). Additionally, 
EEOC claimed that the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 
defense of employers to charges of employment discrimination under 
Title VII may not include state protective laws because such laws 
conflict with Title VII. A BFOQ is a condition "reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business." The second 
major defense to Title VII, that of business necessity, holds that pro- 
duction of a product safely and in conformity with the law is an ac- 
ceptable business purpose. But to manufacture a product in an atmo- 
sphere that the employer has itself deemed unsafe for nearly half the 
workforce cannot constitute a business necessity (Trebilcock, 1978). 
A 1972 amendment to EEOC's guidelines invalidated laws that pro- 
hibited employment before and after childbirth (Babcock et al., 1975). 
The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act further barred employers 
from discriminating against women on the basis of their reproductive 
status. By allowing reproduction and production to be complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive for women, the act marked a funda- 
mental gain in reproductive freedom. In its 1978 revised lead stan- 
dard, OSHA discouraged exclusionary policies because the removal of 
females from the workplace, when fertile females and males were 
equally at risk, constitutes disparate treatment based on sex, a viola- 
tion of Title VII. Even where a specific toxin does not pose equivalent 
risks to male and female reproduction, it is still a Title VII violation if 
the employer "protects" members of only one sex through exclusion. 
Indeed, the EEOC had suggested through guidelines and decisions 
that such practices violated Title VII. It also recommended narrow 
interpretation of the BFOQ. 
In United Auto  Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991), the U.S. Su- 
preme Court held that FPPs violate Title VII because they were fa- 
cially discriminatory rather than facially neutral, as the appellate 
court had ruled, because they did not apply similarly to males and 
females, despite evidence that  lead has debilitating effects on the 
male reproductive system. Since FPPs involve disparate treatment 
through explicit facial discrimination, the business necessity and its 
shifting of the burden of proof to the plaintiff, required by Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Antonio (1989), were held to be inapplicable. And al- 
though in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) Johnson 
Controls also argued that a safety requirement for its employees con- 
stituted a BFOQ, the court ruled that the safety exception is limited 
to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the 
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employee's ability to perform job-related activities that are essential 
to that business. The unconceived fetuses of respondents female em- 
ployees are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essen- 
tial to the business of battery manufacturing. Moreover, the incre- 
mental cost of employing members of one sex cannot justify a 
discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender (United Auto 
Workers v. Johnson Controls, 1991, pp. II &III). Neither could John- 
son Controls claim a BFOQ owing to concern about the welfare of the 
next generation and the potential for lawsuits. Title VII mandates 
that decisions about the welfare of future children be left to parents. 
If "Title VII bans sex-si,ecific fetal-protection policies, the employer 
fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted 
negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at 
best" (United Auto  Workers v. Johnson Controls, 1991, p_ III). 
Some experts have also claimed that FPPs violated the equal pro- 
tection clause of the Fifth Amendment because exclusion of women of 
childbearing capacity is drastically underinclusive and overinclusive. 
It is overinclusive in that  some women do not want children, are un- 
able to have them, postpone childbearing, or would terminate a preg- 
nancy by abortion. It is underinclusive in that it does not consider 
adverse effects on male reproductive capacity (USDL, 1977, pp. 11, 13 
[Ex. 148]). In addition, Lichtman argued that requiring evidence of 
sterility is both socially unconscionable and a direct invasion of pri- 
vacy rights (USDL, 1977, p. 14 [Ex. 148]). Miller claimed that it is 
particularly burdensome in cases in which a woman supports her 
family herself, has voluntarily finished childbearing, has an intra- 
uterine device or takes birth control pills, and wishes to work in a 
smelter that is the only major employer in her area (USDL, 1977, pp. 
4730-4731). 
Given the accumulation of countervailing argument, policy, and le- 
gal precedent, many find it extraordinary that FPPs were not out- 
lawed until 1991. Yet the case law that preceded the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision reflected marked judicial ambivalence. For example, a 
case regarding lead exposure, Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers In- 
ternational Union v. American Cyanamid Co. (1984), was lost in the 
court of appeals. Judge Robert Bork's opinion stated that the women's 
decision to be sterilized was an "employee reaction to the employer 
policy" for which the company could not be held liable. In United Auto 
Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991), the appellate court upheld FPPs 
for two reasons. First, it ruled that infertility could legitimately be 
construed to be a BFOQ. Second, despite the lack of legal precedent, 
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corporate fear of lawsuits from persons exposed to lead in utero was 
held to be justifiable. California ruled similarly, in Johnson Controls 
v. California Fair Employment and Housing Commission (1990), that  
excluding fertile women was necessary, especially when employees 
failed to prove availability of less discriminatory alternatives. In addi- 
tion, Title VII was weakened by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to 
increase employees' burden of proof in disparate-impact cases (see 
above, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 1989). 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct), of 
which the lead standard is a part, also formed the basis for another 
important  legal challenge to FPPs. That  is, some experts argued that  
a worker's right to a safe and healthful workplace is guaranteed by 
the OSHAct. This act (which applies to the reproductive systems of 
both women and men) assures that  insofar as practicable, " n o  em- 
ployee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or lJf~ expec- 
tancy as a result of his [or her] work experience" (USDL, 1977, p. 
1142). Mm~y witnesses (e.g., Madar, Lichtman, Hawes, Rosen, Wood- 
cock) maintained that  the lead standard must  protect all workers, 
regardless of gender, reproductive capacity, or intent (USDL, 1977, p. 
6751; 5906; p. 9 [Ex. 71]; pp. 2, 4, 5, 6 [Ex. 148]; p. 22 [Ex. 171]). 
According to Madar, "carving out a huge sector of the workforce from 
OSHA's protection contradicts that  goal of Congress" (USDL, 1977, p. 
1142). Many held that  coercing sterilization, requiring proof of infer- 
tility, reducing wages, raising the possibility of job loss, and thereby 
making it difficult for workers to engage in production as well as 
healthy reproduction violated workers' rights to reproductive freedom. 
Furthermore,  the act places the burden of providing a safe work- 
place on the employer. Yet a policy of excluding fertile women shifts 
that  burden to employees at the expense of their jobs. The act also 
prohibits discharge of or discrimination against workers who speak 
out against health and safety problems in their plants. Within the 
context of FPPs, however, Madar suggested that  a fertile worker 
could not freely complain about excess lead exposure if she could lose 
her job should overexposure be proven (USDL, 1977, p. 1142). 
Several key judicial precedents reflect a conservative trend in the 
courts before the U.S. Supreme Court decision. As argued in the con- 
clusion of this article, these legal disputes and trajectories are partic- 
ularly relevant today because of the widespread Republican victories 
in the 1994 elections. In the next section, the social and economic 
underpinnings of FPPs will be examied more fully. These social 
forces, viewed within their legal context, help to explain why FPPs 
were practiced with impunity until 1991. 
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The Soc ia l  and  E c o n o m i c  Context  
Overall, protective laws for women are problematic in three pri- 
mary respects. First, some women do not require them. Second, many 
men would also benefit from them. Third, gender-defined protective 
laws easily become a basis for exclusion (Hill, 1979). The lead indus- 
try is a prime example of these issues. Women are not equally suscep- 
tible to the hazards of lead, men as well as women are vulnerable, 
and the policies have resulted in exclusion of women. Therefore, it is 
important to attempt to understand why protective laws held sway 
fbr so long. This article argues that a dual labor mark~t, economic 
utility, and demographic conditions regarding work and family roles 
were largely responsible for the maintenance of FPPs. 
The Dual Labor Market 
The dual labor market is defined as a labor market in which many 
occupations are labeled as male or female. This market may help to 
explain why FPPs were adopted in some workplaces but not others 
(see also Draper, 1993). Many scholars view protective laws as par- 
tially if not totally motivated by desires to keep women out of men's 
jobs. In addition, protective laws were good examples of how em- 
ployers, dictated by considerations of managerial convenience, could 
turn workplace problems into problems with specific workers. Blam- 
ing the victim does indeed justify the status quo. If women are natu- 
rally handicapped, less than equal workers, then occupational seg- 
regation is natural, not the contrivance of discriminatory employment 
practices (Kaminer, 1990). 
Exclusionary policies were used increasingly by unions to keep 
women out of men's jobs (Babcock et al., 1975). Both FPPs and  earlier 
protective laws were applied selectively to male-dominated jobs. The 
premise of occupational segregation (or dual labor market) theory is 
that women are excluded from better jobs reserved for men and are 
therefore crowded into the few jobs that men do not want (Blumrosen, 
1980). Wom~n have been excluded from higher-paying jobs such as 
those involving night work and lifting heavy weights (Chavkin, 1979). 
In the United States, job segregation by gender began in the nine- 
teenth century in the New England mills. 
Evidence indicates that industrial jobs closed to women paid higher 
wages than traditionally female jobs with similar hazards that were 
not closed to women. For example, FPPs were prevalent in predomi- 
nantly male industries that exposed workers to lead, benzene, zinc, 
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and microchips, but there w~re no exclusionary policies regarding re- 
productive hazards from x-rays, anesthetic gases, and video display 
terminals (VDTs) (Bell, 1979; Chavkin, 1979; Meier, 1987; Petchesky, 
1979; Wright, 1979). In 1978, OSHA mandated lower levels of waste 
gas in operating rooms so that no exposed female employees would be 
forced to choose between sterilization and job loss. Similarly, the na- 
tion's first law regulating VDTs was signed in 1990. 
Similar concerns for female workers at the Harris Semiconductor 
plant are also consistent with a dual labor market explanation of 
FPPs. After a 1986 study found increased miscarriage rates among 
wafer fabrication workers who mass produce microchips at Digital 
Equipment Corporation, Harris compared three groups of female 
workers at the plant--those in fabrication areas with chemicals, 
those in nonfabrication areas with chemicals, and those who work 
with neither. Researchers found that a small group of female engi- 
neers had a higher rate of miscarriages than other female workers or 
the general population. Their failure to study male workers or part- 
ners of female workers, notwithstanding evidence of male reproduc- 
tive hazards in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) and 
other cases, is logically consistent with occupational segregation the- 
ory. 
Economic Cost-Benefit 
In addition to maintaining job segregation, FPPs have also satisfied 
corporate needs for a reserve army of labor (generally composed of 
women and minorities). Frequently, women are part of a reserve la- 
bor force that will work in a less permanent fashion and for lower 
wages than men. A market economy seeks growth of production, 
which in turn depends upon adequate resources, cost-trimming prac- 
tices by management, technological innovation, sales, and profits 
(Felker, 1982). Adequate resources include a ready supply of wage 
laborers, whil~ cost-trimming practices include the lowest expendi- 
tures on wages and occupational safety. 
Industries also contain costs when they minimize safety hazards, 
pay very low fines to OSHA, and pay an occasional lawsuit won by an 
injured or diseased worker. Thus an economic cost-benefit analysis of 
corporate investments in a safe workplace suggests that significant 
efforts to improve working conditions may not always be financially 
prudent. Many industries, however, were reluctant to risk a third- 
party lawsuit by an injured child. To some analysts, "the real villain 
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of this story is the tort liability system with its excessive payments 
based on what often appears to be the whim of the juries involved" 
(Richardson, 1981). 
Work and Family Roles 
Demographic factors related to women's and men's work and family 
roles have also contributed to shifting views of FPPs. Although pro- 
tective policies have been challenged for nearly a century, the inten- 
sity and outcome of these debates have varied widely. Recent legal 
evaluations of FPPs may have been partially influenced by changing 
demographics as well as shifting currents of cultural sentiment (see 
Starrels, 1994, for an analysis of various social definitions of conflict 
that are relevant to FPPs). t There have been dramatic changes re- 
garding marriage, divorce, f~, ~ility, and labor force participation. Spe- 
cifically, many Americans have been postponing childbearing and 
having fewer children. There are fewer traditional, two-parent fami- 
lies, and more adults live in households and raise children without a 
spouse or partner present. In addition, women rapidly entered the 
labor force during the past two decades. Thus we have witnessed 
marked alterations in women's relative involvement in employment 
and family roles. Concomitantly, the view that marriage and child- 
bearing may not be the primary goals for all women has been gaining 
greater acceptance. 
These social forces challenge one of the dominant assumptions un- 
dergirding FPPs- - tha t  it is appropriate to define work and family 
roles differently for men and women. Thus they reinforce legal and 
moral arguments that  FPPs are unfair and discriminatory. Further- 
more, lower court decisions in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Con- 
trols (1991) may represent backlash strategies frequently evident 
during periods of economic transition and changing social roles. It is 
probably not accidental that traditional gender roles are fostered dur- 
ing times of high unemployment and economic crisis. Nor is it coinci- 
dental that heightened pressures toward traditionalism occur at a 
time of rising female reproductive and economic independence as well 
as more prevalent worker struggles for occupational safety (Felker, 
1982). 
At a broader level, FPPs are consistent with several assumptions 
regarding the proper roles for men and women: (a) particular occupa- 
tions are differentially suitable for females and males; (b) females re- 
quire more protection than men; and (c) reproduction is mainly a fe- 
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male function. At a policy level, these notions help to explain the 
intense corporate concern about third-party lawsuits. Although offi- 
cials cited such lawsuits as a primary reason for excluding women, 
this concern presupposes that  children of female workers are more 
likely to sue than children of male workers. 
The social and economic underpinnings of FPPs, viewed within 
their legal context, help to explain why FPPs were practiced with im- 
punity until 1991. The following case study of the OSHA lead hear- 
ings presents scientific evidence regarding female, male, and fetal 
susceptibility to lead. Moreover, it explores the ways in which such 
evidence may be appropriated or used by industrial and other organi- 
zations 4o serve specific socioeconomic goals including those discussed 
previously (e.g., maintaining a dual labor market, realizing economic 
profit, and preserving a good corporate image by avoiding third-party 
lawsuits). 
Case  S t u d y  o f  t h e  O S H A  H e a r i n g s  
This case study analyzes expert testimony from the 1977 OSHA 
hearings to revise the lead standard. In particular, it examines the 
ways in which expert testimony supports or resonates with the histor- 
ical, social, and economic themes discussed previously. 
Scope and Consequences of FPPs 
Many witnesses reported cases of exclusion, some linked directly to 
exclusionary policies and others the result of more informal practices. 
Because of the possibility of fetal intoxication, Ryer stated that  a 
number  of companies considered banning women from jobs in plant 
areas where they could be exposed to lead (USDL, 1977, pp. 6080- 
6081). According to Lundquist, physicians opposed employment of fer- 
tile women except in work involving solely solid metal, thereby dem- 
onstrating their preference not to expose fetuses to lead (USDL, 1977, 
p. 5 [Ex. 151]). Lorio would not endorse use of women workers in 
the production area, especially those of childbearing age, regardless 
of contraceptive measures they might have taken (USDL, 1977, p. 
2833). 
Four companies (General Motors, Bunker Hill, ASARCO, and 
AMAX) claimed that  they did not place women in production areas 
and unequivocally stated their concern for fetuses. Six others (Pres- 
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tolite, General Battery, National Lead Plant, Bell Battery, East 
Helena, and Perth Amboy) banned females from heavily leaded pro- 
duction areas in practice but did not acknowledge having an exclu- 
sionary policy. At one plant, only two people had ever had blood lead 
levels over 80 milligrams. Miller claimed that "irrespective of this and 
despite the lack of any concrete evidence of harm to a fetus at such 
levels of exposure, the company has barred any fertile woman from 
keeping a job inside the smelter" (USDL, 1977, p. 4732). Prestolite 
considered such a policy, East Helena was unclear as to its rationale 
for placement, and Bell excluded women because it was too small to 
invest financially in separate facilities for female employees. Finally, 
three plants (KW, Hamburg, and Reading) demonstrated no gender 
restrictions. 
Sullivan, a lead worker at Bunker Hill, confirmed that the smelter 
required proof of infertility2 Similarly, General Motors placed females 
in occupations with lead exposure only i f  they were postmenopausal 
or provided evidence of tubal ligation or hysterectomy and, in the 
opinion of the plant physician, were incapable of conception (USDL, 
1977, p. 5 [Ex. 225, Attachment A]). This bilevel screening process-- 
requiring outside evidence to be corroborated by corporate person- 
nel--permitted a notable degree of discretion in decisions regarding 
whether a woman was reproductively capable. Clearly, companies 
varied considerably with regard to various dimensions of FPPs-- their  
existence, acknowledgment by corporate representatives, justifications, 
extent, and practical implications. Most companies did implement 
FPPs, and some imposed sterility requirements on female workers. 
The OSHA Lead Standard 
In 1975, OSHA proposed a rule to modify the standard for indus- 
trial lead exposure to 100 micrograms per cubic meter and to provide 
for environmental monitoring, medical surveillance, employee train- 
ing, and other protective measures. It requested submission of writ- 
ten cominents, data, and opillions (USDL, 1978b, p. 52953). In 1977, 
OSHA announced the availability of technological feasibility and eco- 
nomic impact statements and gave notice of an informal hearing to 
begin in Washington, D.C., on March 15, 1977, Two regional hearings 
were also scheduled to begin in April and May. During the seven- 
week Washington hearings, OSHA presented fifteen expert witnesses. 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and 
approximately fifty public participants also testified. Public parties 
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also testified in the regional hearings, nine in St. Louis and thir teen 
in San Francisco. The record was reopened from November to Decem- 
ber to hear  additional evidence on medical removal protection (USDL, 
1978b, p. 52953). 
The preamble to the proposal indicates tha t  OSHA intended to set  
a s tandard applicable to all workers. Yet it permitted 100 micro- 
grams/m 3 of lead, which some considered to be unsafe. Therefore, 
many  civil rights, public health, and feminist groups mobilized 
around this issue during the hearings. The test imony set forth con- 
flicting views on how much lead in the ambient  air environment can 
be safely withstood by workers without  clinical or subclinical symp- 
toms. Opinions also varied with regard to the hazards of lead and the 
best  medical and employment  policies for industry and government to 
adopt. The test imuny extensively addressed reproductive hazards. 
One of the key issues was that  some companies have been reluctant  
to hire fertile women for jobs involving substantial  exposure to lead. 
They were concerned that  these women could become sterile, mis- 
carry, or bear  defective offspring. Some officials warned their fertile 
female employees of the reproductive hazards of lead, suggested they 
undergo sterilization procedures, or t ransferred them to lower-paying 
jobs with less exposure. On the basis of previous studies, OSHA pro- 
posed before the  hearings that  pregnant  women should perhaps be 
considered an especially susceptible group of employees: "Pregnant  
employees and their  fetuses, as well as employees with the sickle cell 
trait, 6 may have increased susceptibility to lead" (USDL, 1975, App. 
A, p. 45947). 7 OSHA argued that  a child born to a lead-exposed parent  
of either gender is more likely to have birth defects or behavioral dis- 
orders, to be mental ly retarded, or to die within the first year  of life 
(USDL, 1978b, p. 52954). 
OSHA's proposal clearly reflects a gender bias. Although it s tates 
tha t  children "born to a lead-exposed parent  of either gender" are at  
risk, it claims that  the only susceptible groups are pregnant  em- 
ployees and fetuses. Men are characteristically omitted from the pre- 
vailing definition of susceptibility. Although the definer in this case 
was OSIIA, several expert  witnesses echoed this view. Thus a major 
purpose of the hearings was to determine if, and to what  extent, cer- 
tain groups were especially susceptible to lead. A related goal was to 
ascertain how any finding of greater  susceptibility should affect the 
lead s tandard (USDL, 1975, p. 45934). Five potential policies were 
that  fertile women might (a) not be hired; (b) be removed from jobs 
with high levels of exposure; (c) be transferred to less reproductively 
hazardous jobs in the same industry without a reduction in wages or 
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loss of seniority and other benefits; (d) participate in a medical sur- 
veillance program with mandatory or voluntary pregnancy testing; 
and/or (e) contribute to the formation of separate standards for expo- 
sure to leadma lower one for women and a higher one for men. 
Eleven industries or trade associations claimed that they would use 
a finding of greater susceptibility to exclude women of childbearing 
age (or another subclass of women) from jobs with heavy lead expo- 
sure or to set separate standards for males and females. Spokesper- 
sons from labor, feminist, medical rights, public health, industrial hy- 
giene, and government groups opposed exclusion and recommended a 
joint yet higher standard that would be safe for all workers, fetuses, 
and children. They also advocated a medical removal program with 
the option to transfer to another job without a reduction in wages. 
OSHA's final standard mandated 50 mg/m 3, a lower level of expo- 
sure, although many civil rights advocates believed this was not low 
enough sufficiently to protect women's and men's reproductive health 
(USDL, 1978b, pp. 52959-52960, 52965-52967). The standard in- 
cluded p~'ovisions for environmental monitoring, record-keeping, em- 
ployee education and training, medical surveillance, medical removal 
protection, hygiene facilities, and other practices (USDL, 1978b, p. 
52952). In particular, it permitted paid removal upon medical advice 
for up to eighteen months. Pregnant employees as well as women and 
men planning to conceive were eligible for removal (USDL, 1978b, pp. 
52974, 52976). 
Following is an analysis of the testimony relevant to the historical, 
social, and economic themes discussed previously. In particular, it 
presents evidence regarding female, male, and fetal susceptibility. 
Moreover, it explores the ways in which such evidence may have been 
appropriated or used by industrial and other organizations to serve 
specific social and economic goals. 
Female Susceptibility 
The proposed rule suggested that females may be more susceptible 
than men to lead. It claimed that a particularly susceptible group was 
female employees of childbearing age. This statement is based on evi- 
dence that lead absorbed into the bloodstream of pregnant women 
crosses the placental barrier and enters the blood of the fetus (USDL, 
1975, p. 45936). Many witnesses shared this view, although protec- 
tion of women from lead contradicts a U.S. Supreme Court case, U.S. 
v. Darby (1941), which explicitly approved protection for both sexes. 
Consistent with U.S.v. Darby, many witnesses claimed that exclu- 
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sionary practices were discriminatory even if well-intentioned. Many 
also argued that OSHA's definition of female susceptibility was im- 
proper, imprecise, overinclusive, and underinclusive. Several crit- 
icized the language of the notice, which describes the at-risk popula- 
tion to be female employees of childbearing age. For example, 
Lundquist suggested a more medically precise term--fertile, gravid, 
or lactating women--because only women who are or plan to become 
pregnant or who are breast-feeding should be categorically excluded 
(USDL, 1977, p. 4512). Similarly, Miller argued that "fertile women 
should not be reckoned with as a class but should be regarded as 
individual human beings" (USDL, 1977, p. 4730). 
Furthermore, studies suggest that females may not be more suscep- 
tible than men. According to Woodcock, animal studies have demon- 
strated that lead harms the reproductive health of both males and 
females (USDL, 1977, pp. 5041-5042). Moreover, Stellman, speaking 
on behalf of the Coalition for Labor Union Women, discussed a study 
of 150 male workers that was conducted by Lancranjan and his col- 
leagues (1975). This study found abnormal spermatogenesis with 
blood lead levels below 60 milligrams, and it noted an obvious and 
highly significant decrease in fertile ability because of asthenosper- 
mia (decreased motility), hypospermia (decreased numbers), and es- 
pecially teratospermia (malformed sperm) (USDL, 1977, pp. 1151, 
1160-1161). 
Arguments of female susceptibility are also based on assumptions 
that the lead level is similar in maternal and fetal blood and that the 
fetus is more susceptible. Fetal susceptibility was considered to be 
possible because children had increased susceptibility. Because some 
mothers with high blood lead levels have normal children, however, 
lead may not be a teratogen. In addition, according to Stellman "there 
is no evidence concerning effects on the fetus at low levels of expo- 
sure" (USDL, 1977, pp. 1159-1160, 4726-4727). Seven witnesses, in- 
cluding industry officials, concurred. Although General Motors ac- 
knowledged decreased fertility in males, it would not accept that 
teratogenesis (abnormal offspring) is linked to male exposure (USDL, 
1977, p. 5 [Ex. 225, Att. A]) or that male and female exposure has 
similar consequences for fetal development (USDL, 1977, p. 6 [Ex. 
225]). 
Linking the current debate on female susceptibility to historical 
precedent, Stellman revealed that policymakers' use of "fallacious his- 
torical references" to female susceptibility and "the use of fallacious 
data or a biased perspective for evaluating the incidence and effect of 
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occupational diseases on women" has been a long-standing practice 
(USDL, 1977, p. 1155). The work of Thomas Oliver in 1902, for exam- 
ple, "which continues to make its way into the literature with persis- 
tent doggedness," states that  "females contract lead poisoning more 
readily, the symptoms are usually more acute, they suffer more se- 
verely and succumb to it more quickly than males" (USDL, 1977, p. 
1155). Oliver claimed that lead is a teratogen that affects women be- 
tween the ages of 18 and 23 mainly during periods such as adoles- 
cence and pregnancy (USDL, 1977, p. 1158). Baetter (1946), however, 
could not locate convincing evidence that  women were more suscepti- 
ble than men. Rather, the notion arose largely from repeated quoting 
in the literature of statements made by one or two industrial health 
authorities. In many cases, arguments were based solely on personal 
opinion (USDL, 1977, p. 1155). 
In sum, divergent views on susceptibility seem to be based on two 
conditions--first, insufficient scientific attention to the effects of lead 
on males, and second, improper interpretation of studies. Madar 
claimed that  FPPs rested on conclusions falsely drawn from fragmen- 
tary scientific work on the effects of low levels of lead exposure 
(USDL, 1977, pp. 1133-1134). Moreover, these conditions have impor- 
tant implications regarding possible motives for FPPs. If fetal health 
was the overriding concern, it is curious that males would not have 
been studied systematically. Dr. Bridbord from NIOSH confirmed that 
not a great deal of work had been done to define who is susceptible. 
Inadequate research could signify industrial and/or scientific resis- 
tance to the possibility that male exposure could contribute to birth 
defects. Although reduced sperm counts, male infertility, and sponta- 
neous abortions from paternal exposure to lead are fairly well docu- 
mented, many scientists do not consider birth defects to be a likely 
outcome of paternal exposure (Richardson, 1981). Miller claimed that 
they proffer this perspective despite the fact that the testes have been 
identified by scientists as the most sensitive organ in the body 
(USDL, 1977, p. 11 [Ex. 155A]). In addition, some children of male 
lead workers have experienced excess lead levels as well as lead poi- 
soning. 
Industrial attempts to define susceptibility were problematic for 
other reasons as well. Stellman claimed that groups of workers at 
greater risk of lead-related symptoms were many and varied, includ- 
ing those with renal or kidney disease, blood dyscrasias, sickle cell 
propensities, and cardiovascular disease (USDL, 1977, p. 1146). Dr. 
Epstein emphasized that "these 'sub-groups' represent an important 
330 Journal  o f  Fami ly  and Economic  Issues 
and large element of the total working population at risk, rather than 
merely a specialized, small population" (USDL, 1977, p. 14 [Ex. 68]). 
Bridbord similarly argued that people with certain preexisting dis- 
eases involving organ systems affected by lead should be considered 
potentially susceptible (USDL, 1977, pp. 1803-1804). 
In addition, toxicological and epidemiological evidence suggests 
that workers exposed to lead who already have a lead body burden 
are probably more susceptible to getting one of these diseases (USDL, 
1977, p. 1153). Stellman further asserted that data on subclinical ef- 
fects suggest possible adverse effects of lead for all workers over and 
above the cited effects for "more susceptible workers" (USDL, 1977, 
p. 1147). Moreover, Stellman argued that stillborns, miscarriages, 
spontaneous abortions, and other reproductive mishaps are associ- 
ated with levels of lead known to have many other toxic effects and 
to make nearly the whole workforce "susceptible" (USDL, 1977, p. 
1159). 
Therefore, many find it inappropriate to designate fertile women as 
more susceptible. Rather, according to Miller, susceptibility should re- 
fer exclusively to individuals with a predisposing pathology, such as 
kidney dysfunction or anemia, interpreted as a "decrement in health 
which would be exacerbated by exposure to lead . . . .  The capacity to 
bear children would hardly fall under the heading of predisposing pa- 
thology" (USDL, 1977, p. 4727). Bridbord claimed that with regard to 
gender differences, NIOSH concluded that "evidence is not really 
clear cut that one could say that women are definitely more suscepti- 
ble than men" (USDL, 1977, p. 1802). According to Lundquist, indus- 
trial hygienists also remained unconvinced that females are m o r e  
susceptible (USDL, 1977, p. 4519). Indeed, the Lead Industries Asso- 
ciation (LIA) conceded in its posthearing brief that the hearings re- 
vealed that females are not more susceptible than males. Stellman 
concluded that there is no scientific justification for defining all 
women of childbearing age as especially susceptible. "The blood levels 
that would probably prevent adverse effects on spermatogenesis is 
comparable to the level probably necessary to prevent adverse fetal 
development" (USDL, 1977, pp. 1161-1162). 
Dr. Hunt similarly characterized the concept of increased suscep- 
tibility as inappropriate, or a "specious concern," because lead has 
toxic effects on biological systems according to individual dose re- 
sponses. According to Hunt, persons in the labor force have hetero- 
geneous responses that are unpredictably governed by genetic and 
somatic endowment (USDL, 1977, p. 660). Bridbord and Dr. Cole con- 
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curl~ed that there is a wide range of individual variation in suscep- 
tibility to le~d. At lower airborne lead levels, blood lead levels can 
range from 40 to 80 mg/100g (USDL, 1977, p. 20 [Ex. 57]). Witnesses 
also argued that  medical and industrial notions of susceptibility may 
have been misguided because tbey focused on relative weaknesses 
rather than strengths. According to Miller, "our very thinking about 
susceptibility may be somewhat turned around. Rather than talking 
about certain groups or individuals as being susceptible, should we 
not instead describe their counterparts as being super immune" 
(USDL, 1977, p. 4727). 
With regard to the social and economic context discussed previ- 
ously, the testimony counters traditional views regarding work and 
famil~ roles (i.e., occupational suitability and the need for protection). 
Traditional gender role conceptions suggest that women do not need 
well-paying jobs as much as men and that motherhood should be the 
paramount female role. Motherhood has been a long-standing obsta- 
cle to equality (Schwartz, 1989, discusses another example, the 
"mommy track"). Lichtman claimed that protective laws are discrimi- 
natory and contribute to the dual labor market. They are attempts to 
restrict women's employment options in certain jobs and in specific 
historical periods in which their services are not considered necessary 
or valuable. 
Fetal Susceptibility 
Interestingly, after LIA revoked it~ assertion of greater female sus- 
ceptibility, it shifted its attention to fetal hazards (USDL, 1978a, p. 
54398). This shift in its rationale for exclusionary policies was an im- 
portant turning point in the FPP controversy. Because its argument 
for protecting women had been successfully refuted, it needed to find 
another justification for excluding women. Although United Auto 
Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) adopted the terminology FPPs, 
the hearings uscd the term exclusionary policies. Importantly, this 
distinction reflects a refraining of the discourse. Because the conse- 
quences for women were the same regardless of the guise under 
which they were excluded, it is conceivable that exclusion was the 
desired outcome and rationales were interchanged to achieve this end. 
There was virtual consensus among expert witnesses (i.e., Epstein, 
Needleman, California Department of Health, Piomelli, Woodcock, 
Lichtman, Hunt) that a fetus is equally if not more vulnerable than 
adults to lead (USDL, 1977, p. 14 [Ex. 68]; p. 1 [Ex. 69]; p. 1 [Ex. 211]; 
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p. 20 [Ex. 57]; p. 5041; p. 6 [Ex. 148]; p. 659). The margin of certainty 
and the extent of vulnerability became subjects of intense debate, 
however. Exclusion has sometimes been based on minimal evidence of 
high blood lead levels and potential fetal danger. In these instances, 
exclusion could be premature, if not totally unwarranted. Anecdotal 
evidence of fetal harm includes the case of one woman at the Bunker 
Hill smelter. After being denied a leave of absence in 1974 when she 
was four and a half months pregnant, she quit and had a miscarriage 
one week later (USDL, 1977, pp. 6128-6129). 
There is not much scientific evidence on fetal hazards of lead. 
Scholars generally believe that a fetus, because of its rapidly develop- 
ing tissue, is more susceptible to toxins than are adults. Notwith- 
standing the overall accuracy of this claim, it may not always be true. 
The Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) argued that the evi- 
dence that lead is responsible for birth defects is "rather preliminary" 
(USDL, 1977, p. 1 [Ex. 203]). According to Miller, there is no evidence 
of fetal effects at low levels of exposure (USDL, 1977, p. 12 [Ex. 
155A]). Furthermore, the fetus may respond differently to lead than 
to other toxins. Lundquist argued that "in humans, factors as yet un- 
identified may mediate transfer of lead across the placenta" (USDL, 
1977, p. 3 [Ex. 151]). 
A major issue in the FPP controversy, according to Ryer, Piomelli, 
and the U.S. Department of Labor, arose from evidence that the fetus 
is most susceptible during the first trimester, when a woman may not 
yet know she is pregnant (USDL, 1977, pp. 6081, 20 [Ex. 57]; USDL 
1975, p. 45936). Lundquist stated that the preponderance of medical 
evidence suggests that fetal hazards are greatest during the first six 
weeks of pregnancy (USDL, 1977, p. 7 [Ex. 151]). Industrial officials 
have used this finding to justify exclusion of all women of childbear- 
ing age from jobs with lead exposure to prevent fetal exposure before 
a woman knows she is pregnant. 
Yet several arguments militate against such generalizations. First, 
evidence for first trimester loss is based primarily on studies of acute, 
severe lead poisoning. Second, fetal nourishment during the first ten 
to twelve weeks comes primarily from endometrial decidua, not blood 
nutrients passed through the placenta. Therefore, cord blood, al- 
though frequently used to determine fetal lead levels, is not a sensi- 
tive indicator of a fetus's uptake of lead. Third, human teratogenic 
effects of lead have not been reported. Fourth, the fetus is vulnerable 
throughout gestation. Indeed, Stellman pointed out that a study by 
Barltrop (1969) found that long-term exposure leads to more serious 
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symptoms because the lead content of fetal tissue increases through- 
out pregnancy (USDL, 1977, p. 5 [Ex. 72, App. I]). Fifth, Hunt 
claimed that probable susceptibility of uterine musculature to lead 
(above 100 rag/100 ml blood) could lead to expulsive contractions 
(USDL, 1977, pp. 7, 9, 16 [Ex. 59]). 
Finally, evidence that toxic insults to the conceptus in very early 
pregnancy usually have lethal effects suggests that exclusion of fer- 
tile women may be unnecessary or unjustifiable (Wolkowski-Tyl, 
1980). If pregnancies are, indeed, terminated before women know 
they are pregnant, this should alleviate fear of third-party lawsuits 
(Richardson, 1981). In sum, the above evidence regarding fetal and 
female susceptibility suggests that exclusion of women is neither the 
only nor the best way to protect the unborn. Protecting fertile men 
and, indeed, all workers is the only way to protect all existing and 
potential offspring, as well as adults. 
NotwithsLanding the above evidence, industries felt that potential 
lawsuits from offspring justified FPPs. According to Bell, "we do not 
hire fetuses. We could get a damage suit as a result of somebody that 
comes up with a cleft palate developed through the lead, although it 
[the cleft palate] might be perfectly normal" (USDL, 1977, p. 1674). 
Madar argued that industrial concern about a fetus is less motivated 
by humanitarianism than by a fear that the fetus may be born de- 
formed and live to sue them successfully. "As remote a possibility as 
that is, it weighs heavier on their minds than taking the steps neces- 
sary to prevent such harm to any of the offspring of either male or 
female workers by cleaning up the workplace" (USDL, 1977, p. 1137). 
Others have confirmed that the potential for litigation, albeit mini- 
mal, is psychologically burdensome. "Although no lawsuit for tort lia- 
bility as a result of reproductive effects on the fetus through toxic 
substance exposure has ever been filed, employers live in fear of such 
cases" (Richardson, 1981). Furthermore, attorneys have been charged 
with exacerbating the concerns of corporate clients. Attorneys have 
claimed that a female employee with a deformed child in arms would 
get millions from a sympathetic jury if there were any way that work- 
place exposure to a toxic substance could be linked to a tragic result 
(O'Leary, 1981). The image of a deformed child in front of a jury sug- 
gests that industries may worry about symbolic as well as monetary 
and human costs. In addition, courts have held that women are un- 
able to sign away the right of the child to sue for occupationally 
caused defects (Samuelson, 1977; Stillman, 1979). 
It is possible that notions of appropriate work and family roles for 
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men and women help to explain this corporate concern, which is highly 
disproportionate to the documented risk. The above attorney's refer- 
ence to female employees reflects the inaccurate belief that  females are 
more susceptible. According to Miller, since evidence of fetal abnor- 
malities caused by paternal exposure is grounds for a lawsuit, a male 
lead worker's wife may sue on behalf of an injured child (USDL, 1977, 
p. 4730). Furthermore, two men have brought tort liability suits for 
birth defects allegedly caused by occupational exposure to toxic sub- 
stances (Bureau of National Affairs, 1979a, p. 339, 1979b, p. 558). 
Industr ial  concern over suits arising from female exposure has con- 
tr ibuted to the exclusion of women. "Employers have chosen to ex- 
clude women where men can easily fill jobs as preferable to running 
even a very low risk of high penalty in a possible tort liability suit" 
(Richardson, 1981). When the two goals of equal opportunity and 
avoidance of lawsuits collide, many companies have given priority to 
the latter. Furthermore,  some industries prefer equal employment 
lawsuits to damage suits from deformed children (USDL, 1977, pp. 
6734-6735). For example, Varner from ASARCO stated tha t  the com- 
pany had three suits pending with EEOC for its exclusionary policies, 
based on the advice of its medical director (USDL, 1977, p. 6663), 
even though it foresaw the possibility of such suits. 
OSHA Conclusions Regarding Susceptible Groups 
OSHA reached the following conclusions from the testimony re- 
garding female, male, and fetal susceptibility: 
Exposure to lead results in decreased libido, impotence and sterility in 
men and decreased fertility, abnormal menstrual and ovarian cycles in 
women. The course of pregnancy is adversely affected by exposure to 
lead. There is conclusive evidence of miscarriage and stillbirth in 
women who were exposed to lead or whose husbands were exposed. 
Children born of parents either of whom were exposed to lead are more 
likely to have birth defects, mental retardation, behavioral disorders or 
die during the first year of childhood. (USDL, 1978b, p. 52954) 
Lead can cause genetic damage to both male and female germ cells 
(USDL, 1978b, p. 52959), and there is conclusive evidence of a dose- 
response relationship with respect to teratospermia (USDL, 1978a, p. 
54421). Thus effects on male fertility warrant  serious concern. 
OSHA found little direct evidence of fetal effects yet  claimed tha t  
the fetus would be at  least as susceptible as children. Thus the t ruly 
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susceptible groups aLe fetuses snd nursing infants, not all females of 
childbearing a~e. Moreover, "damage to the fetus represents impair- 
ment of the reproductive capacity of the parent and must be consid- 
ered material impairment of functional capacity under the OSHAct" 
(USDL, 1978b, p. 52959). OSHA confirmed that the first trimester is 
not necessarily the period of greai:st  danger. Lead increasingly 
passes through the placental barrier from twelve to fourteen weeks 
through birth so the fetus is at risk throughout gestation. OSHA rec- 
ommended that  both males and females planning pregnancies should 
have blood levels below 30 mg/100 gms (USDL, 1978b, pp. 52959- 
52960). Transferring males and females from high-exposure areas or 
requiring proof of inability to reproduce is essential (USDL, 1978a, p. 
54398). 
C o n c l u s i o n s  and  Po l i cy  Impl i ca t ions  
The above discussion reveals the ways in which various historical 
and social forces have contributed to the maintenance of FPPs. Evi- 
dence from the OSHA hearings held before the revision of the lead 
standard in 1978 shows that industries legitimated FPPs in specific 
ways that ultimately proved to be unjustifiable. Moreover, serious le- 
gal challenges to FPPs foreshadowed the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision that  FPPs are unconstitutional. It is curious that FPPs re- 
mained a trenchant social policy dilemma for such a long time. The 
gender division of labor in both the workplace and the family helped 
sustain FPPs. As this case study demonstrates, job segregation 
shapes the social organization of reproduction. Similarly, reproduc- 
tive roles, capacity, and intent have a direct bearing upon whether 
women enter and remain in certain occupations. FPPs help preserve 
job segregation, for which several functions have been suggested. 
Most notably, it supports a system of economic stratification by gen- 
der. In so doing, it ensures a reserve army of female workers to fill 
jobs during periods of ec :nomic expansion, war, and other cyclical oc- 
currences. Thus job segregation aids a market economy. 
Several policy implications may be derived from the above case 
study of FPPs. First, the historical and legal transitions and trajecto- 
ries evident in this case study demonstrate that family health policy 
often promotes the interests of some groups over and above those of 
other groups. Although the U.S. Supreme Court in United  Au to  Work- 
ers v. J o h n s o n  Controls  advocated for workers' and their children's 
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health in 1991, the judicial ambivalence preceding this landmark de- 
cision may well foreshadow the next chapter in family health policy. 
Despite the relatively clear-cut decision forged in United Auto  Work- 
ers v. Johnson Controls (1991), we witnessed nearly a century of dis- 
crimination in which companies practiced FPPs with impunity and 
courts were in conflict over their legality. 
Two primary questions regarding occupational health emerge from 
this case study. First, to what extent will employers fulfill their re- 
sponsibilities to protect the health of employees and any present or 
future offspring? Will employers duly accept the mandate set forth in 
United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls (1991) and related rulings, 
or will they simply do business as usual and suffer whatever conse- 
quences might befall them? Second, what is the proper role of the 
government in enforcing occupational health laws? If fines for OSHA 
violations are small and inspections are infrequent, a cost-benefit 
analysis (see Starrels, 1994) would tend to dictate a lax corporate 
stance toward remedying violations of the OSHAct. Similarly, given 
the concern about future, third-party lawsuits detailed in the present 
case study, it is not unlikely that many employers will continue to opt 
for a discrimination suit rather than a tort injury suit from an em- 
ployee's child. 
A broader concern regarding occupational health policy is whether 
new legislation will be supported and passed by the newly elected 
Republican Congress. Although it is too early to predict with cer- 
tainty the implications of the 1994 elections, there is reason to doubt 
whether the legislature will generate and embrace new laws designed 
fully to protect occupational health. The final years of this century 
may not offer a political climate favorable to laws that set new stan- 
dards for toxins or monitor and enforce current standards. Further- 
more, although this case study focuses on one particular family 
health policy in the arena of occupational health, it may have broader 
relevance for a range of family health policies. The broader social, 
economic, and historical forces that appear to have undergirded FPPs 
and their demise will likely operate m debates over other family 
health policies as well (e.g., abortion rights and health care). 
Thus health advocates in academics, law, policymaking, and service 
provision may be vitally needed to forge new solutions to old prob- 
lems. Public education campaigns, involvement of health profes- 
sionals in corporate settings, and legal and political interventions 
may offer different yet creative avenues to achieve important occupa- 
tional health goals as we plan for the next century. Although indus- 
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t r i a l  hyg ien i s t s  a n d  phys i c i ans  h a v e  b e e n  i n s t r u m e n t a l  in dea l ing  
w i th  occupa t iona l  h e a l t h  concerns ,  i t  m a y  be usefu l  for emp loyees  to 
i n t e r a c t  w i th  h e a l t h  p rofess iona l s  who  do not  t e n d  to r e p r e s e n t  t he  
i n t e r e s t s  of  m a n a g e m e n t .  The  t r e n d  in m a n a g e d  h e a l t h  care  m a y  of- 
fer  a s e r end ip i t ou s  o p p o r t u n i t y  for h e a l t h  p rac t i t i one r s  to educa t e  
a n d  advoca te  for t h e i r  cl ients.  S imi la r ly ,  legal  p rac t i t i one r s  m a y  be  
able  to f ind new w a y s  to educa t e  employees  a n d  e m p l o y e r s  a n d  to 
he lp  e n s u r e  t h a t  h a r d - w o n  vic tor ies  in cases  such  as  United Au to  
Workers v. Johnson  Controls (1991) p rov ide  a legacy  for  new, signifi-  
c an t  ga ins  in  occupa t iona l  hea l th .  
N o t e s  
1. Testimony from the hearings is referenced this way throughout the manu- 
script. Exhibits are abbreviated as Ex. 
2. See the Appendix for a list of expert witnesses and their  affiliations. 
Names of expert witnesses throughout the article are listed in the Appen- 
dix. 
3. See, for example, Radice v. New York, 254 U.S. 292, a 1924 case that  
prohibited women from night work in restaurants.  
4. Recent legislative attention to day care and parental  leave has also been 
stimulated in large part  by demographic shifts. Changes in labor force 
participation pat terns have normalized the need for day care in a way 
that  feminist ideology could doubtfully accomplish (Kaminer, 1990). Over 
half  of new mothers remain in the workforce and over one-half of two- 
parent  families with children under six are dually employed. Therefore, 
day care may be more necessary than at any other time since the institu- 
tionalization of the nuclear household and separate spheres for men and 
women in the late nineteenth century. 
5. Her employer's policy was to require a physician's s tatement of infertility 
before a woman could work in the smelter area. Twenty-nine women, in- 
cluding herself, were removed in 1975 and could not return without such 
statements.  No men were removed. In 1978, Bunker Hill was not hiring 
any women in production, regardless of their childbearing capacity. The 
six women then working in the smelter area, between age 25 and 50, all 
produced s tatements  of infertility. Two, including herself, underwent ster- 
ilization procedures to save their jobs (USDL, 1977, pp. 6090-6094). 
6. The issue of susceptibility of racial and ethnic groups, especially blacks, 
may not be unrelated to the question of female susceptibility. Since sickle 
cell anemia is a disorder that  affects mainly blacks in the United States, 
it is important  to note that  at tempts by the lead industry to define 
women, blacks, and other minority groups as more susceptible could re- 
sult in exclusion of these groups from the workforce. The major focus of 
this article, however, is female susceptibility and concomitant corporate 
policies to exclude fertile women. 
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7. Other  susceptible subgroups include those suffering from renal  insuffi- 
ciency or anemia .  
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APPENDIX 
Selected Witnesses, Organizational Affiliations, and Occupations 












Industrial Consultant, AMAX 
National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
Lead Industries Association 
ASARCO 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
Legal Aid Society, Alameda County 
Medical Director, ASARCO 
Penn State University 
Women's Legal Defense Fund 
Consultant, Independent Associa- 
tion of Secondary Lead Smelters 
Lead Battery Plant 
Olga Madar President, Coalition of Labor Union 
Women (CLUW) 
Claudia Miller United Steelworkers of America 
Herbert Needleman Director, Lead Exposure Study, 
Children's Hospital Medical 
Center, Boston 
Sergio Piomelli Director of Pediatric Hematology, 
New York University 
MaryAnne Rosen CLUW, St. Louis chapter 
Flo Ryer Director, OSHA's Office of Special 
Standards Program 
Jeanne Stellman Chief, Occupational Health and 
Toxicology, American Health 
Foundation 
Ms. Sullivan Bunker Hill Smelter Lead worker 
Mr. Varner ASARCO 
Leonard Woodcock President, International Union of Union Leader 


















Source: Hearings on the proposed s tandard  for occupational exposure to lead (un- 
published) by USDL, OSHA, 1977, Washington, DC. 
Note: Only the last name is included when the first name was not available. 
aOccupation was not known. 
